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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
ARTHUR HARDMAN, dba HARD-
MAN AUTO SALES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
8663 
(Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages of the record. 
The parties will be referred to here as they appeared in 
the trial court.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is the third c~se to reach this Court arising out 
of the same head-on collision. On December 20, 1954, 
plaintiff was driving, and four others were riding, an 
automobile in a westerly direction on highway 40, ap-
proximately 10 miles west of Salt Lake City when .an 
eastbound automobile was driven by defendant Child 
on the wrong side of the road and into plaintiff's auto-
mobile. Two of the passengers were killed, the other two 
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pas.sengers were injured and plaintiff here, George Wil-
liams, received very serious personal injuries. 
He w,as awarded judgment in the sum of $78,055.17 
and it is from this judgment defendant Hardman appeals. 
Defendant Child has not appealed. 
The liability of defendant Hardman is based upon 
the imputation to him of the negligence of defendant 
Child on the theory that Child was his servant, or agent, 
or they were engaged in a joint venture. 
The Statement of Fact.s set forth in the Brief of 
Appellant does not adequately reflect the testimony es-
tablishing plaintiff's case. An adequate statement is con-
tained in the opinion in Anderson v. Hardman, 313 P. 
2d 459 (not yet reported in the Utah reports). This 
latter case is the first of this group of cases to come be-
fore the Court and it has already been decided. \Ye sub-
mit the decision in that case requires an affirmance of 
the case now before the Court. 
This appeal is based upon the insufficiency of the 
evidence to prove the relationship between Child and 
I-Iard1nan ,and upon asserted errors in the instructions 
regarding that relationship. Defendant Hardman also 
contends the damage.s awarded were excessive. 
\V e will n1ake such statement of facts as we deem 
nece~~.a r~- under the points where they will be pertinent. 
\Ve will 1neet each of the points raised by appellant in 
the order in which he sets them forth in his brief. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT DEFENDANT CHILD WAS THE AGENT OR 
SERVANT OF DEFENDANT HARDMAN OR HIS JOINT 
VENTURER AND DEFENDANT HARDMAN IS LIABLE FOR 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT CHILD AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS ON THE LAW AND ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY ON ALL MATERIAL ISSUES. 
POINT III. 
THE VERDICT WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND DOES NOT 
APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLU-
ENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT DEFENDANT CHILD WAS THE AGENT OR 
SERVANT OF DEFENDANT HARDMAN OR HIS JOINT 
VENTURER AND DEFENDANT HARDMAN IS LIABLE FOR 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT CHILD AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW. 
The evidence in this case is the same as that pre-
sented in Anderson v. Hardman, supra. In the case at bar 
it was shown that Hardman was in the used car business 
at Sunset, Utah, (123, 124) and that in furtherance of 
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this busine.ss he took Child to Tooele to sell him a truck. 
Their testimony was again to the effect that they had 
agreed that Child was to pay $500.00 on the return to 
Sunset and the balance of $150.00 would be paid "in a 
short period of time" (138). Both Child and Hardman 
contemplated that they would have further documents to 
sign. Child testified he knew he was going to sign a 
contract, but did not know what it would provide (103). 
Hardman testified that there was to be a note and al-
though the note had been mentioned, nothing was said 
as to what it would contain. It would be produced for 
the first time for Child's perusal at Sunset (138, 139). 
Hardman had not delivered the certificate of title nor 
bill of sale to Child (126). The certificate of registra-
tion had not even been delivered to Hardman so he had 
not delivered it to Child (126). It was agreed on all 
sides that the trans.action was not to be completed until 
they had returned to Sunset ( 84, 128). On the return trip 
the license plates of Hardman were used on the truck 
(85). 
It was necessary, in furtherance of defendant Hard-
man's used car bu.siness, to return the truck to Sunset 
to complete the ultimate purpose of that business to wit: 
the sale of the truck. He was taking another car back on 
his wrecker and he requested Child to drive the truck 
to Sunset ( 87). HardJ.nan also suggested that they pass 
each other on the w.ay back so they could keep in touch 
with one another (~7, 88). As .a 1natter of fact, Child was 
passing Hardman in con1pliance with this suggestion at 
the time the collision occurred. 
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All of the foregoing facts are uncontroverted and 
undisputed. We submit that this Court in the Anderson 
case held that the responsibility of Hardman for the 
negligence of Child was established as a matter of law. 
This Court therein said: 
"There is no substantial conflict in the evi-
dence ; and the facts concerning the relation be-
tween Hardman .and Child are uncontroverted. 
The question is what conclusion of law must be 
drawn from the evidence." 
This Court then held that title had not passed from 
Hardman to Child and in going from Tooele to Sun.set 
they were acting in furtherance of Hardman's business 
in completing the sale of the truck. l-Ienee Child's negli-
gence was imputed to Hardman. 
The uncontroverted evidence establishes this rela-
tionship and therefore it is not necessary to look to the 
in.structions. The trial court should have instructed as a 
matter of law that Hardman was responsible for the 
negligence of Child. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS ON THE LAW AND ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY ON ALL MATERIAL ISSUES. 
As stated .above, we do not believe the Court need 
consider these instructions but in order to make a com-
plete answer to appellant's brief we wiH consider each of 
the contentions he makes with respect to the claimed 
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error_s in the instructions given by the court. Defendant 
does not contend that any requested instruction not 
given should have been given. 
Defendant contends that his theory was not properly 
presented. He also contends that the repetition of the 
instructions concerning the issue of ma.ster and servant 
was prejudicial. It is difficult to understand how his 
theory could not have been presented and at the same 
time was presented to the point that it was prejudicially 
repetitious. 
Instruction No. 1 purported to set forth the con-
tentions of the parties and cannot be considered an in-
struction setting forth the elements necessary for plain-
tiff to prove in order that the jury might return a verdict 
in his favor. The issue of agency ·was thoroughly and 
completely covered in the instructions and plaintiff was 
required by the instructions to prove this issue. De-
fendant Hardinan answers his own criticism of this in-
struction when he refers to the court's instruction No. 2. 
In that instruction the court specifically states the burden 
of proof is upon plaintiff to prove that Child was negli-
gent and in order to recover against defendant Hardman, 
plaintiff had the burden of proof to _show that Child was 
negligent and that the relationship between Hardman and 
Child was that of principal and agent, or master and 
servant, or joint venturers ( -!6). 
Further exploring the contention of defendant Hard-
man rr>garding failure to set forth his theory it should be 
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noted that the jury were instructed concerning the rela-
tionship between Child and Hardman in seven instruc-
tions. Three of these instructions were tho.se requested 
by defendant Hardman. Two were requested by plain-
tiff and two were prepared by the court. Defendant 
Hardman's requested instructions 7 (33), 9 (35) and 
13 (39) were given in substance in the court's instructions 
7 (51), 9 (53) and 6 (50) respectively. Comparison and 
review of the.se instructions wiH show that all phases 
of defendant Hardman's theory was pre'sented to the 
jury, including that of right of control. See Instructions 
No. 6 (50) 9 (53) and 11 (55) . 
Another startling contention of defendant is that 
there should be a reversal because the trial court gave 
instruction No. 6 (50). Instruction No. 6 is defendant 
Hardman's requested instruction No. 13 (39) and it is 
that requested instruction, word for word, even including 
the italicized portion of the instruction set forth on Page 
8 of appellant's brief. 
Defendant contends there was no evidence to justify 
submission of the case to the jury on the theory of master 
and .servant or joint venture. We submit that Anderson 
v. Hardman, supra, has foreclosed any such argument as 
this. 
We respectfully submit that Child's neglect should 
be imputed to Hardman as a matter of law and hence 
we need not consider any claimed error in these instruc-
tions. However, even though we do give conscientious 
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con.sideration to these instructions it at once becomes ap-
parent that the jury was completely and adequately in-
structed on the law defining the relationship between 
Hardman and Child and no error was committed in this 
regard. 
POINT III. 
THE VERDICT WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND DOES NOT 
APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLU-
ENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE. 
Under this point defendant makes the bald conten-
tion that the verdict is excessive and appears to have 
been given under the influence of passion and prejudice. 
He does not undertake to discuss or analyze the facts. 
There is good reason why he did not. It is apparent 
that if he had done so, it would appear without question 
that this contention would fall of its own weight. 
Defendant complains of the failure to give defend-
ant's requested instruction concerning passion, preju-
dice and syrnpathy. The trial court did instruct on this 
subject as follows (64): 
''Yon should consider all the evidence impar-
tially, fairly and without prejudice of any kind, 
and from such consideration, in connection with 
the instructions giYen you by the court, you should 
reach such a Yerdict as will do justice between the 
parties." 
\Ve sub1nit the burden is upon appellant to establish 
that the verdict is exressiYe. He has not attempted to 
di::.;ellarge that burden. \Yith but two pages of his brief 
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devoted to this subject and with no discussion of the 
facts, we cannot believe him to be serious in this conten-
tion. Even though defendant does not discuss the facts, 
we will do so to complete'ly put at rest any question about 
the amount of this verdict. 
We believe it will be helpful to review a few of the 
authorities which define the role the appellate court plays 
in the review of the contention that damages are excess-
ive. 
In our jurisprudence the jury has been selected as the 
tribunal to fix damages. The trial court has a discre-
tion to exercise in passing upon the amount of the verdict. 
The question of damages w,as presented to the trial court 
by defendant's Motion for a New Trial (66, 67). This 
motion was overruled ( 68). The trial court there by 
placed his stamp of approval upon the amount of the 
verdict. This approval is given great weight by appellate 
courts and very rarely is such approval overruled. 
The importance of this approval has been recognized 
by this Court in Stephens Ranch & Live Stock Co. v. 
Union Pac. R. Co., 48 Utah 528, 161 Pac. 459, wherein it 
was stated: 
"Necessarily upon such a question appellate 
courts must, to a large extent, rely upon the judg-
ment and discretion of the trial court. That court 
is in a much better position to observe and deter-
mine whether a jury was actuated by passion or 
prejudice, or by both, in returning a verdict for 
an amount larger than the evidence justifies, or 
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whether the jury was merely mistaken with re-
gard to the amount that should have been allow-
ed." 
In Geary v. Cain, 69 Utah 340, 255 P. 416 the Court 
stated: 
"*** in ease of doubt, the deliberate action 
of the trial court should prevail. Otherwise this 
court will sooner or later find itself usurping the 
functions of both the jury and the trial court." 
See also Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P. 2d 759 
(1954). 
After the trial court has approved the amount of the 
verdict, the appellate court only reviews the ruling on 
the basis of whether the trial court has abused its dis-
cretion. It was so held in Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande 
R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 Pac. 1185, wherein the Court 
stated: 
"Still that court, in such particular, is not 
supreme or beyond reach. Its action may never-
theless be inquired into and reviewed on an al-
leged abuse of discretion, or a capricious or arbi-
trary exercise of power in such respect. Such a 
review is not a review of a question of fact, but 
of law. A ruling granting or refusing a motion 
for a new trial is certainly reviewable when the 
proceedings with respect to it are properly pre-
served and presented. That has not been ques-
tioned. Of course the ruling will not be disturbed 
on evidence in conflict or on matters involving 
discretion. Yet our power to eorrect a plain abuse 
of discretion or undo a mere capricious or arbi-
trary exercise of power cannot be doubted." 
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Neither this Court nor the trial court should set its 
opinion against the opinion of the jury. To do so would 
but usurp the function of the jury. In the Jensen case 
this Court stated: 
"Neither is either party on that question en-
titled to the judgment of the court below in a case 
of tort tried to a jury. Both parties, as to that, 
are entitled to the unprejudiced judgment of the 
jury. That is exclusively within their province. 
Their power and discretion, when properly exer-
cised and when they have been properly directed 
as to the measure of damages and the mode of as-
sessing it, may not be interfered with merely be-
cause the court above or below may think the 
amount rendered is too large, or even may think 
it appears to be larger than the evidence apparent-
ly or fairly justifies. A court, vacating a verdict 
and granting a new trial by merely setting up his 
opinion or judgment against that of the jury, but 
usurps judicial power and prostitutes the consti-
tutional trial by jury." 
The case most widely cited as laying down the proper 
rule to be followed by an appellate court is the case of 
Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 45, where Chancellor 
Kent stated: 
"*** The damages, therefore, must be so ex-
cessive as to strike mankind at first blush, as be-
ing, beyond all measure, unreasonable, and out-
rageous, and such as manifestly show the jury to 
have been actuated by passion, partiality, preju-
dice, or corruption. In short, the damages must be 
flagrantly outrageous, and extravagant, or the 
court cannot undertake to draw the line; for they 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
have no standard by which to ascertain the excess. 
(Oleveland, etc. Co. v. Hadley, 170 Ind. 204, 82 
N.E. 1025, 84 N.E. 13, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 535, 16 
Ann. Cas. 1; 15 Am. Jr., p. 623.)" 
This Court has also had occasion to address itself 
to this problem in Pauly v. il1cCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 
P. 2d 123 (1947). Most of the earlier Utah cases were 
cited and the rule was expressed .as follows: 
"Since the Jensen case above quoted, it is well 
settled that this court has power to, and will, con-
sider assignments of error based on excessive ver-
dicts. (cases cited) But, although we have the 
power to order a new trial in case of an excessive 
verdict, it is a power which we have rarely, if 
ever, exercised. However, in the case of Shepard 
v. Payne, supra, we ordered a remission of $2,500 
from a $10,000 verdict. In that case, the excess 
was not the re.sult of passion or prejudice, but was 
determinable as a matter of law. 
"Where we can say, as a n1atter of law. that 
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have 
been given under the influence of passion or preju-
dice, and the trial court abused its discretion or 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a mo-
tion for new trial, we 1nay order the \erdiet set 
aside and .a new trial granted. Jensen Y. Den\er & 
R.G.R. Co., supra: and other cases cited aboYe fol-
lo·wing- that decision. But 1nere excessiveness of a 
verdid, without 1nore. does not necessarily show 
that the verdict was arriYed at by passion or prej-
udiee. Stephens Ranch & LiYe.stock Co. Y. Fnion 
Par. R. Co., supra. It is true that the verdict 
might be so grossly excessive .and disproportionate 
to the injury that we could say frmn that fact 
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alone that as a matter of law the verdict must have 
been arrived at by passion or prejudice. But the 
facts mu.st be such that the excess can be deter-
mined as .a matter of law, or the verdict must be 
so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscience 
and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice, or cor-
ruption on the part of the jury. McAfee v. Ogden 
Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra; \Yard v. Denver 
& R. G. W. R. Co., supra. This is not such a case. 
"The verdict here was admittedly liberal. But 
the mere fact that it was more than another jury, 
or more than this court, might have given, or even 
more than the evidence justified, does not conclu-
sively show that it was the result of passion, prej-
udice, or corruption on the part of the jury." 
* * * 
"The jury is allowed great latitude in assess-
ing damages for personal injuries. Miller v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. 2d 865. The 
present cost of living and the diminished purchas-
ing power of the dollar may be taken into consid-
eration when estimating damages. Coke v. Timby, 
57 Utah 53, 192 P. 624; McAfee v. Ogden Union 
Ry. & Depot Co., supra. 
"We can discover nothing in this ca.se, except 
the amount of the verdict, which indicates passion 
or prejudice, .and, as we have seen, passion and 
prejudice are not necessarily inferred from an 
excessive verdict, without more. No exception was 
taken to the jury or any member thereof. No 
conduct on the part of the jury, evincing pas_sion 
and prejudice, has been. ca~led to . our atten~ion. 
The only point of complaint IS the size of verdict." 
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The last paragraph quoted is particularly applicable 
here because no exception or objection was leveled at the 
jury or any member thereof or at any conduct of the jury. 
Defendant relies solely upon the amount of the verdict. 
To show how sparingly and with what hesitancy this 
power should be invoked we point to the fact that this 
Court has never set aside a verdict on this ground. The 
Court recognized the fact in Ladder v. Western Pacific 
R. Co., 259 P. 2d 589 (Not yet officially reported in the 
Utah reports) (1953) where it was stated: 
"But we find no case where this oourt has 
held that as matter of law passion and prejudice 
were shown merely by the excessive amount of 
the verdict *** ." 
With these rules in mind let us now turn to the evi-
dence presented in the case at bar. 
The jury returned .a verdict of $78,055.17. This con-
sisted of general damages in the an1ount of $70,000.00 
and special damages in the sun1 of $8,055.17. These spe-
cial damages 1nay be further broken down a.s follows: 
Hospital expenses ------------------------------------$5,406.32 
Doctors' bills ---------------------------------------------- 2,624.00 
Ambulance -------------------------------------------------- 2-!.85 
Total ---------------------------------------------~------$8,055.17 
Counsel states that this verdict is unreasonably high 
1n comparison with other verdicts in this jurisdiction. 
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While we have been following rather closely for a num-
ber of years the verdicts for injuries in this and other 
jurisdictions, we confidently assert that so far as this 
jurisdiction is concerned, the injuries suffered by plain-
tiff were worse than any we have ever encountered. The 
injuries suffered by plaintiff are both tremendous .and 
frightful. The amount of the verdict pales into insigni-
ficance when it is compared with these injuries. 
Mr. Williams was the driver of the automobile and 
was on the left side, which side apparently sustained the 
brunt of the impact. At the time of trial, twenty-six 
months after the accident, plaintiff was in a cast incasing 
both legs and both hips and was still being hospitalized. 
It appeared further hospitalization would be necessary. 
Bony union had not been effected in his left leg, his right 
arm was useless. 
A mere recapitulation of the injuries sustained by 
him shows their aggravated character. 
The collision occurred December 20, 1954, shortly 
after 4:00 o'clock p.m. Dr. Marion B. Noyes first saw 
plaintiff at approximately 8 :00 p.m. on that day at the 
County Hospital (151). At the time he arrived, the medi-
cal staff at the County Hospital was treating plaintiff 
for shock. 
Plaintiff was suffering from acute shock; there was 
a scalp laceration going clear across his forehead; there 
were multiple cuts, abrasions and hematose contusions. 
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He had a badly comminuted fracture with abnormal dis-
placement at the upper end of his left femur; he had a 
fractured right arm and a fractured right leg. This latter 
fracture went into the tibial plateau, which is the top 
of the tibia and the weight bearing portion of that joint. 
He was also suffering from a concussion of the brain 
and was unconscious. The cut across the forehead was 
described as "ragged and dirty." He also had a cut ear 
and in the area of his neck he had many cuts, ecchymosis, 
black and blue spots, and hematose collection of the blood 
underneath the skin. The 8th, 9th and lOth ribs had been 
fractured .and the lung punctured, letting air into the 
chest cavity. After transfusions of blood and saline 
transfusions and IB fluids, he was taken to the LDS 
I-Iospital (151, 152). 
After arriving at this hospital they continued to 
treat him for shock. It was impossible to give the frac-
tures adequate treatment because of his condition and, as 
the Doctor stat,ed, it would do no good to fix the fractures 
if it killed the patient. 
The doctor was unable to start any active treatment 
of the fractures until Decmnber 31, 1954 (160). 
We will take each of the injuries and conditions 
and delineate in detail the extent of the injury, the treat-
ment given and the result obtained. 
The following is a list of the ti1ne spent by plaintiff 
in the lw~pital fr01n the date of the collision to the date 
of trial: 
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Dates No. of Days 
l. Dec. 20, 1954 to April 17, 1955 ________________ 118 
~. Aug. 13, 1955 to Aug. 20, 1955____________________ 7¥2 
3. Oct. 5, 1955 to Oct. 7, 1955__________________________ 3 
4:. Nov. 18, 1955 to Dec. 10, 1955____________________ 22 
5. Feb. 20, 1956 to Mar. 11, 1956 ____________________ 20 
6. l\1ar. 26, 1956 to Apr. 3, 1956____________________ 8 
7. July 14, 1956 to July 28, 1956__________________ 14 
8. Jan. 5, 1957 to Jan. 7, 1957________________________ 3 
9. J.an. 14, 1957 to F·eb. 14, 1957--------------------~ 
TotaL _______________________ 2241f2 
In considering the above and also in considering the 
detailed statement of injuries to follow, the Court should 
have in mind two of the elements of damages recoverable 
in a personal injury case. Plaintiff is entitled to recover 
for the mental .and physical pain and suffering which he 
has endured and which he may probably endure in the 
future. Also he is entitled to recover for loss of bodily 
function in the past and for the loss of bodily function he 
may probably suffer in the future. Picino v. Utah Apex 
Mining Co., 52 Utah 338, 173 P. 900. 
SHOCK 
The injuries suffered by plaintiff caused him to 
suff·er shock (151). This condition was considered acute. 
The Doctor stated: "In f.act we treated him all that 
night; it took a lot of heroic treatment to keep him from 
expiring." This wa.s treated by blood transfusions, saline 
transfusion, IB fluids and oxygen. It was not until the 
31st of December that his condition of shock was such 
that they could start to actively treat some of the very 
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serious injuries plaintiff had sustained in the collision. 
( 152, 153). For at le.ast two nights he was about to expire 
(153). 
LACERATIONS 
There were many lacerations, cuts and bruises and 
particularly the laceration that went across the fore-
head ( 151). These wounds were cleaned out and the 
neces.sary treatment given to them. 
FRACTURE OF LEFT FE}.f{;~ 
This is and the fracture of the right arm are the 
most serious injuries sustained by plaintiff. In describ-
ing the injury as shown by X-rays of December 27 the 
doctor testified (157) : 
"Now, the fracture of the left femur was 
high, it was an especially bad fracture. This is 
in the splint and this is the ring you can see 
hanging down, it shows not only a comminution, 
broken across, it is splintered up and down and 
fragmented - which shows a large intervening 
fragment, which in itself complicate.s the fracture 
and the outlet for the fracture." 
In referring to an X-ray taken on Decen1ber 20th, 
the doctor stated as follows (157, 158): 
"It shows the lesser trochanter, the musc.Ies 
attached are loose. 
"Here is another one, the sa1ne night. That 
shows even more so, if you want to see these. 
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"Thi.s is the upper part of the left femur, 
this is what we call the upper fragment, the upper 
broken part, the main shaft is below, and this 
is the large piece intervening-it was knocked 
loose, it was not only broken once, it was broken 
twice .and up and down this way, and it shows a 
bad position. 
"You have got to get these bones together, 
get them in position when they are in that condi-
tion. 
"In other word.s, it is a very badly commin-
uted fracture." 
Immediately after he arrived at the L.D.S. Hos-
pital the doctor put plaintiff's left leg in traction (160). 
On December 31st an open reduction of the fracture 
was attempted. It consisted of making an incision in 
the leg, cutting to the bone, reducing the fracture and 
immobilizing it (160). In order to immobilize the frac-
ture they performed an operation which the doctor 
called Intra Medullary nail pinning. It was necessary 
after this operation to apply a cast to both legs (160). 
\Ve will tre.at of the fracture to the right leg herein-
after. 
On January 7, 1956 the cast was changed (165). 
By August of 1956 it was discovered there was evidence 
of osteomyelitis or low grade infection in the fractured 
femur. To attempt to cure this was the purpose of two 
visits to the hospital. The doctor explained how this 
infection could come from a sequestration of dead bone. 
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Pieces of bone lose their blood supply in case.s of frac-
tures of this kind and they become dead. The body at-
tempts to throw them off and they cause an irritant (168). 
Finally on February 22, 1956 it became necessary 
to perform another open operation (175). The doctor per-
formed what is called a sequestrectomy. At that time 
the dead bone was removed. The doctor also testified: 
"*** we saucerized, which means cleaning out the space 
for the osteomyelitis." Also at this time a bone graft 
was performed in an attempt to promote the healing. 
The bone was taken from the illiac crest of the hip bone 
and placed in the fracture site. Still later on plaintiff 
developed an abscess high on the thigh, which caused 
fever. The doctor testified that they put plaintiff to 
sleep and did an ·open drainage of the abscess (176). 
In July of 1956 an x-ray still showed some dead 
pieces of bone in the left leg. Another open operation 
w.as performed which the doctor called "open drainage.'' 
The pieces of dead bone were re1noved and drainage 
put in to take care of the infection (176). 
On January 15, 1957. the Intra :Jiedullary nail was 
removed and s1nall pieces of dead bone were cleaned 
out of the leg. At that tilne the doctors believed there 
was .a solid bony union, although it was 1nade up of 
rather poor bone. They provided hin1 with what is known 
as a Calver brace to ~upport the leg. Following the re-
moval of the pin he again developed pain and soreness, 
P~peeially on nwve1nent. They re-exercised the leg and 
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found the fracture had not healed. More deformity had 
occurred, so it w.as necessary to again put plaintiff in 
a cast. The cast was put on January 29, 1957. It in-
cluded the entire left leg and across the abdomen to 
the right leg. The purpose of this was to immobilize 
the leg, to give it a chance to heal (177, 178). 
The doctor testified concerning the condition of 
this left leg at the time of trial. There was still osteo-
myelitis present and he believed it would be present 
for an indefinite time. He could not tell the dur.ation of 
this osteomyelitis, but stated that it has been known 
to go from twenty to thirty years and varies from a 
short to a long time. He gave his opinion that so far as 
plaintiff is concerned, it will go for quite .a long while 
(176, 177). 
He explained how osteomyelitis involves the bone 
and eats it out, preventing it from properly healing 
and causes a moth-eaten appearance and loss of the 
bone substance. It causes an inf·ection of the bone itself 
(177). 
There had been no union of the fractured bone of 
the left leg. Another pin had been placed in the leg. 
The doctor testified that it would have to stay in in-
definitely and there was considerable doubt as to the 
healing of this bone. The doctor testified that he would 
very likely have to do further bone grafting to try .and 
promote the healing ( 180). He testified that this leg 
was not as good as it was on September 2, 1956 (181). 
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In making a prognosis of the condition found in 
the left leg, the doctor testified that based on the slow-
ness of the healing, there would be a long protracted 
course and it might po_ssibly heal. He testified he wa::; 
going to give it a chance for a matter of months. If it 
did not heal, he would have to go in and help it with 
bone grafts (183). He testified that he figured the cast 
would have to remain on from four to six months and 
after a reasonable length of time if there was no healing, 
it would be necessary to again operate and perform a 
bone graft and then, of course, plaintiff would have 
to go back in the cast again ( 184). 
He testified very definitely that there \vould be a 
permanent disability in this left leg (184). 
FRACTURED RIGHT ARli 
The humerus bone of the right arm was fractured. 
This area is between the elbow and shoulder. There 
was comminution, that is, the break was not straight 
across, but was jagged and there was displacement (155). 
A cast was put on the arn1 (152). This ·was lmown a~ 
a hanging cast and ordinarily they can hold the weight 
down and set the frarture; howeYei'. plaintiff had to 
lie in bed and the cast did not work too well (15G). 
They could not get the bones in the proper position 
so it was necessary to later go in and put a plate on 
the bone ( 156). 
In spite of the cast and manipulations, the humerus 
ju.st would not stay in place. On January 25th he had 
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an open reduction of this fracture with fixations with 
vitallium plate and screws and supporting cast (165, 
166). 
On April 14th there was a reapplication of the cast 
to the right arm. Of course, there were antibiotics .and 
blood transfusions and all the treatment ordinarily done 
for fractures. 
On November 25, 1955, the right humerus had 
failed to heal during the protracted period of tre.atment. 
The doctor removed the plate and screws, then bone 
grafted it and in.serted .a Rush nail, a particular type of 
intermediary nail. It was put in the inside of the bone. 
The purpose was to form an internal fixation or support 
to the fracture site in order to hold the bones in place 
to implement healing and to correct alignment (174). 
The bone graft was accomplished by taking bone fron1 
other portions of the body and inserting them around 
the fracture site ( 17 4). 
On December 7th a cast was put on plaintiff's right 
arm, shoulder and chest for the purpose of giving sup-
port in addition to that afforded by the internal nail 
(175). The bone had seemed to be healing with bony 
union, but with obvious defects (180). From the X-ray 
taken January 7, 1957, it appeared that the union was 
fairly good, but there was a defect and considerable 
doubt about its healing. This indicated that the pin 
would still have to stay indefinitely and it was very 
likely the doctor would have to do further bone grafting 
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in an attempt to heal the fracture site. He stated that 
the outlook on this was indefinite. He also testified that 
the arm in January of 1957 was not in as good a shape 
as it had been in September of 1956 (181). 
In answering the question concerning the prognosis 
of the arm, the doctor testified that it was going to 
require a long time of fixation and probable bone graft-
ing .and he concluded, "But I would sa:T he is in for a 
long time on that.'' He gave his opinion that plaintiff 
had suffered a permanent disability to his right arm 
(185). 
FRACTURED RIGHT LEG 
Immediately after the collision no active treatment 
could be given this fracture. The leg was placed in a 
pillow splint (152). X-rays were taken and disclosed 
there was a fracture line on the tibia extending into 
the knee joint and into ·what is called the tibial plateau. 
This was onto the weight-bearing surface where the 
femur bears the "·eight onto the lower bones of the 
leg. There was a downward displacen1ent (151, 158). 
On Dece1nber 31st casts were put on this right leg 
along with the cast on the left leg. This was known as 
a pelvic cast. Reduction of the fracture in the right 
knee "·a~ first aeeomplished. In order to do this, two 
large transverse screws were placed in the tibia. This 
is dmw to hold the bone .and also to giYe stability to 
the wobbly joint (162). 
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The cast was changed on January 7, 1955 (165). 
This fracture still has screws in it, but the doctor testi-
fied he was of the opinion he had obtained an excellent 
re,sult so far a.s the knee was concerned and that it was 
healed. He testified that he did not anticipate anything 
further fron1 this knee, but eventually if anything should 
kick up or cause disturbance, it might be necessary to 
remove the screws ( 184). 
FRACTURED RIBS AND LUNG PUNCTURE 
Ribs 8, 9 and 10 were fractured. The lung was punc-
tured and let out air into his chest. This is known a.s 
a pneumothorax (153). Such an injury embraces the 
respiratory system and requires constant observation. 
Air is let out into the lung cavity and the lung collapses 
(159). 
CONCUSSION OF THE BRAIN 
Plaintiff received a concussion of the brain. He 
was uncon.scious when he was brought into the hospital 
(151). On December 31st he could talk a little bit but he 
was not oriented at all to time, place, position, or the 
nature of his injury (153). At the time of trial, twenty-
six months later, he was still suffering from a confusion 
of the brain ( 186) . 
MULTIPLE INJURIES 
Each of the foregoing injuries was serious in and 
of itself. Particularly is this true of the fractures and 
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the concussion. Even to take them individually, without 
their overall effect, would certainly justify the verdict 
which was rendered. However, the multiple nature of 
these injuries has taken its toll on plaintiff's health 
and have sapped his vitality and energy. The doctor 
testified concerning this situation ( 185) : 
"Well, multiple, seriou_s injuries in anybody 
causes a great deal of trouble with what we call 
stress and syndrome. It is hard on the nervous 
system and hard on the health of the individual. 
They are notoriously apt to form complications 
and apt to be slow in healing. When the body has 
many injuries to take care of it has to divide it 
up among many healing area.s. These areas of 
disease and deformity acts as areas of lower re-
sistance and infections and what not are more apt 
to lodge in them. From what complications are 
apt to develop it is always, as a rule, a long case, 
especially in a man that is older. A real young 
individual might heal considerably faster but any-
body who has as many injuries as this man has 
is bound to have a long time." 
And again ( 186) : 
"What we have is what we call stress Syn-
drome, which is quite popular since Dr. Saley 
has brought it out. But it adds up to if :~ou put 
any individual through enough strain and enough 
injury it is going to tax his systen1. It is bound 
to do it, no 1natter who he is. That was well 
proved in the wars and in the serious protracted 
illnesses and so forth. In addition this man had 
confusion of the brain which hasn't been men-
tioned very 1nuch. And so by a con1bination of 
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the confusion of the brain plus multiple injuries 
he has reason for having an upset of his whole 
system." 
The doctor opined that plaintiff would never be 
able to work again (185). He elaborated upon this on 
cross examination by stating that he was sure he would 
not be able to handle the type of work he had been 
doing at the time of the collision and that he would 
not be able to handle a shovel as he had done or any 
hard manual work with a had leg and a bad arm, and 
then (189) : 
"Q. Yes. But so far as any other type of 
more sedentary work why you wouldn't know 
about that at this time, would you~ 
A. Well, I couldn't say whether he could do 
a sitting job of an easy type. He might be able 
to if he is qualified for it." 
The testimony established that plaintiff had only 
performed work which entailed manual labor. He was 
not qualified to do any kind of a sitting job and just 
what a "sitting job" is, is not disclosed. 
In Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 196 P. 2d 
968, this Court in denying the contention there was no 
permanent impairment of earning capacity and in an-
swer to a contention that the injured person there could 
hold a "sitting job," the Court stated: 
"It ·should be noted here that plaintiff w,a8 
not trained or qualified to engage in any other 
. f I t' " ga1n u occupa 1on. 
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The testimony further showed that plaintiff was 
fifty-six year_s of age at the time of the collision and 
fifty-eight at the time of trial. The person who took 
his job in 1955 received the sum of $5100.00 ( 106), there 
having been an increase in salary. 
There are eight separate and distinct elements of 
damages: 
1. Lo_st earnings 
2. Impaired earning capacity 
3. Past physical p.ain 
4. Future physical pain 
5. Past mental suffering 
6. Future mental suffering 
7. Past loss of bodily function 
8. Future loss of bodily function 
\V e believe that the amount of this verdict should 
be sustained upon the first two items alone. Twenty-
six months had elapsed fr01n the date of injury until 
the date of the trial. At $5,100.00 per ye.ar this amounts 
to $11,050.00. If he had continued to work full time until 
sixty-five, that would be an additional seven years or 
$35,000.00. If he then were giYen credit for one-half 
such wages for the balance of his life expectancy (17.05 
yean; at date of trial) .another $25,000.00 would be added 
making a total of $71,050.00. 
""\Ylwn compared with the Yerdict rendered in 
Scldallcr Y. illcCartll,lf. 113 Utah 5-ti. 196 P. ~d 968; 
113 lTtah 560, 19S P. ~d 573, the verdict here is small. 
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In that case the verdict was for $41,212.44 plus specials. 
There plaintiff was .sixty-one years of age when injured, 
trial was thirteen months after the injury and there was 
no bony union in his right leg which had been fractured 
in two places between the knee and ankle. At the time 
of trial the osteomylitis was quiescent and apparently 
healed. The doctor testified plaintiff could return to 
work two .and one-half years after the trial or a total 
of three and one-half years after the injury. 
In the case at bar we have a man fifty-six years 
of age at the time of injury, fractures of the left femur, 
right leg, right arm and other injuries. There was no 
bony union in the left leg after twenty-six months .and 
osteomylitis was still present. The right arm was useless. 
The doctor here testified he would never be able to 
return to work. 
We submit that in comparison with the Schlatter case 
the evidence here establishes more than twice the dam-
ages there allowed and approved. 
This Court sustained a $70,000.00 verdict in Bennett 
v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 117 Utah 57, 
213 P. 2d 325. There plaintiff was younger and only the 
right arm was affected. He had lost this .arm. Here a 
leg and an arm were useless and there were multiple in-
juries as above described. Here the damages were 
greater than in the Bennett case. 
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When we detail the past suffering to which plain-
tiff has been subjected, the numerous trips to the hos-
pital and many operations, it becomes apparent a very 
large and substantial figure would be required to com-
pensate him. His future is indeed dark. He was still in 
the hospital at the time of trial and could look forward 
to more operations and more hospitalizations. His right 
arm was still useles.s as well as his left leg. 
Plaintiff is entitled to recover for both mental and 
physical pain and suffering. Think of the mental suf-
fering to which he has been subjected and the contem-
plation he must have of living a life as a cripple. 
In our judgment $50,000 would be a modest sum 
for the last six elements above enumerated. To be added 
to this are his lost earnings and impainnent of earning 
capacity which would put the amount supported well 
over the $70,000 awarded. 
We submit the verdict here is overwhelmingly sup-
ported by the evidence. 
CONCLUSIOX 
We have in this ease a fifty-eight year old man 
who probably will be totally incapacitated fron1 working 
the rest of his life. He suffered yery serious injuries 
and for two days was expected to die. He has suffered 
permanent disability to both his left leg and right arm. 
At the time of the injury he was a shoYel operator and 
the year following his injury the person who took hi::; 
job reeeived $5,100.00. Now plaintiff can earn nothing. 
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This injury occurred to him while Child and Hard-
man were in furtherance of Hardman's used car business 
and the jury returned a verdict against both Hardman 
and Child. We submit the relationship of principal and 
agent or master and servant or joint venturer was made 
out as a matter of law. In any event, the jury was fully 
instructed on all issues in the case, .and found for plain-
tiff. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment in favor of 
plaintiff should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS & BLACK 
By Brigham E. Roberts 
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM 
By Leonard W. Elton 
Counsel for Respondent 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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